More information : Primary Sources:
It should be noted that there is a discrepancy of 10 days in the dating of contemporary sources, the English retaining the Julian or Old Style Calendar, which was at that stage 10 days behind the Gregorian or New Style Calendar, already adopted by the Spanish in 1582. Thus the date of this encounter was 25 July in English sources, but 4 August in Spanish sources, and other Armada events are likewise dated accordingly.
A Relation of Proceedings. [BM Cotton Julius F.x ff111-117]
'Wednesday the 24th of July, 1588 . . . This afternoon his Lordship gave order that, in the night, six merchant ships out of every squadron should set upon the Spanish in sundry places, at one instant, in the night time, to keep the enemy waking; but all that night fell out to be so calm that nothing could be done.
'The next morning, being the 25th of July, 1588, there was a great galleon* of the Spaniards short of her company to the southwards. They of Sir John Hawkyns his squadron, being next, towed and recovered so near that the boats were beaten off with musket shot; whereupon three of the galleasses and an armado** issued out of the Spanish fleet, with whom the Lord Admiral in the ARK, and the Lord Thomas Howard in the GOLDEN LION, fought a long time and much damaged them, that one of them was fain to be carried away upon the careen; and another, by a shot from the ARK, lost her lantern, which came swimming by, and the third his nose. There was many good shots made by the ARK and LION at the galleasses in the sight of both armies, which looked on and could not approach, it being calm, for the ARK and the LION did tow to the galleasses with their long boats. At length it began to blow a little gale, and the Spanish fleet edged up to succour their galleasses, and so rescued them and the galleon, after which time the galleasses were never seen in the fight any more, so bad was their entertainment in this encounter. Then the fleets drawing near one to another, there began some fight, but it continued not long, saving that the NONPAREIL and the MARY ROSE struck their topsails and lay awhile by the whole fleet of Spain very bravely, during which time the TRIUMPH, to the northward of the Spanish fleet, was so far to leeward as, doubting that some of the Spanish army might weather her, she towed off with the help of sundry boats, and so recovered the wind. The BEAR and ELIZABETH JONAS, perceiving her distress, bare with her for her rescue, and put themselves, with their hardiness, into like perils, but made their parties good notwithstanding, until they had recovered the wind; and so that day's fight ended, which was a very sharp fight for the time.
'Now forasmuch as our powder and shot was well wasted,*** the Lord Admiral thought it was not good in policy to assail them any more until their coming near unto Dover, where he should find the army which he had left under the conduction of the Lord Henry Seymour and Sir William Wynter, knight, ready to join with his Lordship, whereby our fleet should be much strengthened, and in the meantime, better store of munition might be provided from the store. On Friday, being the 26th of July, 1588, his Lordship, as well in reward of their good services in these former fights, as also for the encouragement of the rest, called the Lord Thomas Howard, the Lord Sheffield, Sir Roger Townshend, Sir Martin Frobiser [sic] and Sir John Hawkyns, and gave them all the order of knighthood aboard the ARK. All this day and Saturday, being the 27th of July, the Spaniards went always before the English army like sheep . . . ' (1)
* SANTA ANA, Recalde's capitana, damaged in the action of the 21st, which was eventually wrecked at Le Havre. ** a capital ship *** expended
July 25. Sir George Carey to Sussex.
'This morning began a great fight betwixt both fleets, south of this island 6 leagues,* which continued from five of the clock until ten, with so great expense of powder and bullet, that during the said time the shot continued so thick together that it might rather have been judged a skirmish with small shot on land than a fight with great shot on sea. In which conflict, thanks be to God, there hath not been two of our men hurt . . .
'The fleets keep the direct trade** and shot into the sea out of our sight by three of the clock this afternoon; whereupon we have dissolved our camp wherein we have continued since Monday. . . . From Carisbrooke Castle, this 25th of July, at 8 hours in the night. Your Lordship's to command,
'George Carey.' (1)
*18 miles, 1 league = 3 miles. Original footnote states: 'As the fleets were well in sight at the time, the distance is enormously exaggerated; but down to the beginning of this century there was no way in use to measure the distance of a ship, and the guesses were often extremely wild'. [See, also, however, source (4), under 'Pictorial Evidence'.] **Fairway
[Referenced to Calendar of State Papers Domestic Vol.213, No.43, but calendared (in summary) as No.40, and said to date from 26 July in (2).]
Relation of Medina-Sidonia. Printed in La Armada Invincible, tom. ii, and here reproduced in translation:
'Thursday the 4th, Feast of St. Dominic, the SANTA ANA and a Portuguese galleon were somewhat astern, which the enemy assaulted with great fury. The galleasses, Don Alonso de Leyva and other ships went to their assistance; and the galleasses did so well, that they rescued them although they were surrounded by many of the enemy. At the same time that this conflict was in the rear, the enemy's admiral and other great ships assailed our capitana; they came nearer than the first day, discharging their large pieces from the lower deck, and cut the capitana's mainstay, slaying also some soldiers; there came to his succour the SAN LUIS, in which was the maestro de campio Don Augustin [Mexia], who confronted the enemy, Juan Martinez de Recalde, and the SAN JUAN of the squadron of Diego Flores, in which was D. Diego Enriquez, and Oquendo, which placed themselves in front of our capitana, being by the currents prevented from keeping together, and the other ships did the same. Thereupon the enemies retired, but their admiral being much damaged, rested somewhat to leeward of our fleet. Our capitana cast about towards her, and Juan Martinez de Recalde, and the SAN JUAN DE SICILIA, and the capitana of the galleons of Castile, and the GRANGIN [sic],* and all the other ships of our armada, the enemy's fleet recovering the wind, and guarding their admiral which was so spoiled in the fight, that she struck the standard and discharged pieces to show her need of succour, and was now towed by eleven of the enemy's long boats. Our capitana, and the almiranta, and the rest of the ships were gaining on her so much, that the enemy stood towards her, to support her, so as it appeared certain that we would that day succeed in boarding them, wherein was the only way to victory. But at this moment the wind freshened in favour of the enemy's admiral, whereby she began to slip away from us, and to leave the boats which were towing her; whereupon the enemy's fleet recovered the wind, which meantime had fallen somewhat to leeward. The Duke seeing that in the proposed assault the advantage was no longer with us, and that we were now near the Isle of Wight, discharged a piece and proceeded on his course, the rest of the armada following in very good order, the enemy remaining a long way astern. The same day the Duke despatched Captain Pedro de Leon to Dunkirk, to the Duke of Parma to advertise him as well of the place wherein he was, and of his success, as also that it was fitting he should come out with as little delay as possible to join with this fleet. He gave the squadron of D. Pedro de Valdes in charge to D. Diego Enriquez, son of the viceroy, having seen him to be careful and able in matters belonging to the sea.' (3)
* for GRAN GRIN
Pictorial sources:
The seventh in Robert Adams' near-contemporary series of charts depicting the progress of the Armada shows the two fleets south of the Isle of Wight. The Spanish, in a crescent formation, remain to the east of the English fleet, drawn up in four squadrons.
St. Catherine's Point on the Isle of Wight is incorrectly labelled Dunnose Point, but the action is depicted as being due south of St. Catherine's; the most northerly ships in the respective fleets being approximately 14 miles south of St. Catherine's, all the ships seen to be pursuing a direct easterly course. This appears to be in keeping with George Carey's letter (1)(2), in which the battle was said to have been 6 leagues or 18 miles south of the Isle of Wight. As footnoted in (1), there appears to be some discrepancy between George Carey's estimate of the distance of the fight and its visibility from the island.
The wind rose is at south-west.
To the south the chart appears to depict the incident in which the galleasses interposed themselves between the stricken SANTA ANA and her consort, and the English fleet, although it is also possible that it depicts the attack upon the isolated TRIUMPH to the south. (4)
Secondary Sources:
The English objective was to deny the Spanish entry to the Solent either from the westward or the eastward. The NONPAREIL and MARY ROSE referred to by Howard in (1) were in Drake's squadron. The testimony of a Seville captain to the seaward of the Spanish fleet stated that 'the enemy charged upon the said wing in such wise that we who were there were cornered, so that, if the Duke had not gone about with his flagship . . . we should have come out vanquished that day.'
It is thus suggested that the northerly squadrons of the English fleet were unable to impede Spanish access to the Solent from the eastward, but that the southerly squadron under Drake was working into the seaward flank of the Armada in order to break it and force it to leeward, i.e. to a north-easterly course, and thus past the entrance to the Solent from the east onto the Owers sandbanks off Selsey Bill. Thus the Armada were unable to attain any objective they may have had of gaining the Solent or to mount an invasion and were forced to continue up the Channel. (8)
It is considered unlikely that the Spanish ever planned to enter the Solent from the west, since they would have run the gauntlet both of the Needles and the battery of Hurst Castle. However, the approach from St. Helen's Roads would only have been possible between 7am and noon on that day, otherwise the tide and current would have been against such an approach.
It is suggested that the stragglers SANTA ANA and SAN LUIS DE PORTUGAL were a similar trap to the one set by Martin Frobisher in the TRIUMPH a couple of days previously.
The position at 9am is interpreted as south of Dunnose Point.
Recalde is quoted after the TRIUMPH slipped from his grasp:
'In my opinion, we should not have desisted as our flagship did, until we had either made them run aground or else followed them into a port. Nor was it wise to sail . . . beyond that anchorage, near to the Isle of Wight . . . ' (9)
Interpretation of position of battle:
There need be no discrepancy between George Carey's suggestion (1) that the battle was visible from the Isle of Wight and his estimate of the distance as 6 leagues away in the same letter, as suggested in the footnotes to that source.
St. Catherine's itself is 41m above sea-level and today bears a lighthouse whose light is visible for 25 miles. A light at St. Catherine's existed from approximately 1323 onwards (5) and may have provided a suitable vantage point from which to see events on the horizon. Visibility to the horizon from a tower or vantage point 100ft up can be as much as 22 miles (6), suggesting the possibility that Carey was not exaggerating although his estimate may not have been particularly accurate. Much would, of course, depend on the state of the wind, tide, and currents at the time, and weather conditions. Calm weather conditions on a summer's day suggest conditions of good visibility which may have extended the range of vision for onlookers.
It is also possible that the chart is based on a collation of written accounts, suggesting that it may not be a wholly independent source. Nevertheless, it is believed that this series of charts was commissioned by Howard of Effingham (4) while George Carey's letter stands outside the orbit of that source, and thus would suggest a broad corroboration of that distance.
If so, the main action is likely to have taken place outside coastal waters, but, allowing for the possibility of error or an over-estimate on George Carey's part, it is also possible that some or part of the action on this day took place just within the 12 nautical mile limit. That being the case, the position of the battle has been interpreted as 12 miles south of St. Catherine's Point, but this is for representative purposes only and is not intended to be conclusive. (7) |